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In both cases during the questioning the defendants had not been indicted and were considered suspects rather than defendants. Refusing counsel in the pre-trial stage violates due process only if the
accused is so prejudiced thereby that his subsequent trial would lack
44
basic fairness.
The circumstances of each particular case must be
45
considered.
The majority in the Spano opinion advanced a new test to be
applied in determining the admissibility of confessions. The courts
must now examine whether the confession obtained is in accord with
the "traditional principles" of due process. There is no criterion or
definition given by the Supreme Court, but on the basis of this study
of the recent trend of decisions, the "traditional principle" test appears to be an embodiment of the "fundamental fairness" and "inherently coercive" tests as well as the "totality" norm. It is the first
time the Court has so vigorously denounced the use of deceptive
practices in extracting confessions and emphasized that the events
surrounding the confession took place after a grand jury had found
cause to indict him. The result is to be commended. However, it
is also possible that the decision might result in an interference with
state criminal enforcement if it were construed to mean that no
police questioning at all could occur in the absence of counsel. Perhaps
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas sets a good norm. He
states that once Spano had been indicted for a capital crime and was
no longer a mere suspect, he was at that point entitled to counsel
under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.

M
DEFAMATION - BROADCASTER'S LIABILITY - § 315 OF FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT IMPLIES COMPLETE IMMUNITY. -On
the

basis of a statement made by a political candidate during a campaign
broadcast, defendant-broadcaster was sued for libel. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act ' rendered the station immune from liability. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, since section 315 prohibits
the broadcaster from censoring political broadcasts, the privilege of
immunity from liability "must follow as a corollary." FarmersEduc.
and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
44 Crooker v. California, supra note 42, at 439; see Lisenba v. California.
314 U.S. 219 (1941) (dictum).
45 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, supra note 42, at 440; House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42 (1945).
148 Stat. 1088 (1934)
(amended by 66 Stat. 717 (1952), as amended,
47 U.S.C. §315 (1952)).
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Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act requires that
if a licensee-broadcaster permits a legally qualified candidate for public office to use its facilities, "he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office," and provides that such
licensee-broadcaster "shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section." 2 The section expressly states that no obligation is imposed on the broadcaster
to make its facilities available to any such candidate.
Defamation by radio has resulted in differences of judicial opinion as to whether the defamatory utterances ought to be classified as4
libel,8 particularly when the defamations are read from a script,
slander, 5 or accorded a status separate and apart from libel and
slander." Disagreement also exists as to whether the broadcaster's
liability in general ought to be based on strict liability 7 or negligence.8
More specifically within the area defined by section 315, two important questions have arisen: 1) does section 315 bar the deletion
of libelous material from the candidate's speech, and 2) if so, does it
give the broadcaster immunity from state libel suits?
The Court in the present case, answering the first question in
light of legislative history and the purpose for which section 315 was
passed, stated that the broadcaster has no power to censor libelous
matter. This, of course, excludes language which is not guaranteed
by free speech, that is, obscene, indecent or profane language. 9
2

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

3 Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1956),

aff'd mere., 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1957).
4 Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) ; Sorensen v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismitsed sub noin.
KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933). See RrsTATEmEmT,
ToRTs § 568, comments e, f (1938).
5 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
However, here the court found that since the remarks were not slanderous
per se and the plaintiff had not alleged that he had sustained special damages,
the complaint was dismissed.
6 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d
302 (1939). See also Newhouse, Defamation by Radio; A New Tort, 17 ORE.
L. REV. 314 (1938).
7 Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed
sub itwn. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933). See also
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W.D. Mo. 1934),
where the court explained that both the broadcaster and publisher can protect
themselves by insuring against the loss occasioned by strict liability.
8 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., note 6 supra, where
the court rejected the analogy between the newspaper and the broadcaster,
stating that the former is subject to greater scrutiny. See Kelly v. Hoffman,
137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948), where the court rejected the absolute
liability theory and stated that a broadcaster was analogous to a "disseminator"
and consequently was not liable for defamatory statements contained in material published by him unless fault was proven. For a criticism of the
Summit Hotel distinction, see Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. REv. 12, 25-27 (1948).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1958).
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Judicial decisions have been incongruous in answering the second question. In Sorensen v. Wood 10 the broadcaster was held to
the same degree of responsibility for libel as a publisher, namely,
absolute liability. However, a qualified privilege against liability was
granted the broadcaster over statements which it had no power to
control in Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Inc." The
court here felt that when a radio station exercised due care in the
selection of the lessee of its facilities and in the inspection of the
script, it should not be liable for extemporaneous defamatory remarks.
The defense of privilege was also allowed the radio station in Charles
Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co. 1 2 in the absence of proof that
the broadcaster maliciously permitted its facilities to be used, or acted
in bad faith. Disharmony also existed in the federal jurisdiction.
The Federal Communication Commission, 13 interpreting section 315
in In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co.,' 4 stated that the absolute pro-

hibition against censorship would relieve the broadcaster of all liability for defamatory utterances occurring during a political candidate's speech, irrespective of the provisions of state law. In essence,
the FCC stated that federal legislation had pre-empted the field and
the broadcaster was free from civil liability for any libelous matter
broadcast in the course of a speech coming within section 315.1r
Immediately following the FCC ruling, a district court in Houston
Post Co. v. United States 16 sharply criticized the Commission ruling
as being directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court construction 17 and the legislative history of section 315.18 On the other
hand the court in Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,19 recognized the authority of the FCC, and stated that where the broadcaster is powerless to censor libelous matter without violating federal
law, the broadcaster was without fault.
Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court in the
present case, 20 stated that since a broadcaster is required to grant
equal time to political candidates and denied the control of allegedly
libelous material, it would be unconscionable to permit civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed on the broadcaster for the very
10 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dimnissed sub nonr. KFAB
Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
11 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
12 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
13 Hereinafter referred to as FCC.
14 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948)
(dictum).
15 Id. at 1074. In 1948, a select committee of the House considered the
Port Huron ruling and did not propose any change in § 315. Lamb v. Sutton,
164 F. Supp. 928, 933 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
16 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
17 Id. at 203.
is Id. at 204.
19 89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
20 Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 526
(1959).
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conduct that section 315 demands. 21 The Court stated that state
laws can and have been abrogated when their enforcement was "'an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' "22
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom three other justices dissented, 23 accused the majority of wrongful speculation with regard
to a broadcaster's liability in the state courts' application of section
315.24 Frankfurter stated that state law should be overruled only in
the situations where it is absolutely and clearly in conflict with federal
law. He maintained that this is not so in the present case.
Prior to the instant case forty-four states had enacted statutes
granting various degrees of immunity to broadcasters. 25 This statu21 Id. at 531. As the Court stated, § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat.
1164, specifically granted the station immunity. This section was adopted
by the Senate but was removed by the Conference Committee without any
explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 18 (1927).
The Court pointed out that Congress since 1948 has made "significant addi-

tions to ... section [315] without amending it to depart from the Commission's view." Supra note 20, at 533.
22Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535
(1959).
23 Ibid. Jhustices Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart joined in the dissent.
24

The minority contended that the inactivity of Congress to enact a specific

immunity after the Port Huron ruling, in the light of a Congressional Report,

negated rather than supported the conclusion that Congress acquiesced to the

ruling. Id. at 539; see H.R. REP. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
25 See Friedenthal and Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on
Political Broadcasting, Section 315 of the Cominunications Act, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 445, 485 (1959). This article set forth the law regarding immunity in
forty-three states and pointed out the absence of immunity statutes in another
six states. A breakdown of these statutes is as follows:
a) Fifteen states provide, without mentioning censorship, that stations
will not be liable for defamatory broadcasts made by candidates for public
office; these included North Dakota.
b) Fifteen other states provide stations with immunity if they have no
power to censor either under federal law or FCC regulations.
c) Two states declare that a station will not be liable if it has no power
to censor under federal law or FCC regulations, provided that it makes certain
announcements during the broadcast period. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 337 (a)
(stations must announce that the views of the speaker are not necessarily those
of the station); S.C. CODE § 23-7 (Supp. 1957) (stations must announce that
the broadcast was not censored).
d) Three states provide that a licensee is liable if he has not exercised
due care, but compliance with federal law or FCC regulations is deemed to
constitute due care. Two of these states (Florida and New Mexico) place
the burden on the plaintiff to show no due care on the part of the licensee.
In the third state, Minnesota, the burden is on the station and thereby it might
weaken its statute in providing absolute immunity in cases in which § 315
is held to prevent censorship.
e) Eight states grant some statutory protection such as defense of due
care. Presumably if a licensee requests a candidate to delete the defamatory
remarks the duty of due care is satisfied.
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tory protection did lessen the need for remedial federal legislation
but the danger of liability still existed, especially in the six states
which did not have protective statutes.26
An additional problem arose here concerning broadcasts from a
"protected" state which can be viewed and/or heard in an "unprotected" sister-state. What law governed in a situation like this: the
law where the broadcast originated, where the suit was brought, or
the law of the state in which the defamed party was domiciled? 7 As
a result of the diversity of law which governed defamation in the
various states some remedial legislation was necessary. Many attempts had been made to place an express immunity clause within
section 315 but no law has ever been enacted.2 8 A bill 29 introduced
in the 80th Congress would have supplied this needed uniformity but
unfortunately the bill was not reported out of committee. The law
remained in its uncertain position until the Supreme Court, in this
decision, declared that complete immunity could and should be implied within section 315. The stabilization of this situation would
appear to justify the majority's preclusion of state law from its diverse
interferences with federal policy.
The present case does not put forth a talismanic formula to all
the questions which might arise under section 315. The section is
not entirely clear as to whether the non-censorship provision is applicable to both the initial speaker and the subsequent speeches of
opponents, or only to the latter broadcasts. This question arises
specifically from attempts to interpret the proviso attached to section
315: "Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcastunder the provisions of this section."
(Emphasis added). A literal interpretation of this proviso would
imply that the non-censorship provision is all inclusive, prohibiting
the broadcaster from censoring either the first or second candidate's
speech. If this is the case, applying the reasoning in the present decision, the broadcaster would be immune from liability as to both the
f) In the six other states mentioned in this report (Alaska, Delaware,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin) there appeared to
be no statutes regulating political defamation. New Hampshire in 1954 in

Daniel v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc., 10 R.R. 2045, 2046 (N.H. Super.
Ct. 1954), indicated that the Communications Act of 1934 does not prevent
the imposition of liability. Contra, Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.
Tenn. 1958).

g) The Hawaiian statute covering this problem is

HAWAII REV. LAWS

ch. 294, § 11 (1955). No defamation by radio. "The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio shall not be liable for damages for any
defamatory statement published or uttered over the facilities of such station
or network
by any candidate for public office." Ibid.
26
Supra note 25, subd. f.
27 Cf. Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953).
28 See Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 532
n.13 (1959).
(White's Bill.)
29S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 14(d) (1947).
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first and second candidate. A strict interpretation of the proviso, in
view of the fact that section 315 was designed to assure equal protection to political candidates, might imply that only when there is a
second candidate's speech does the non-censorship clause apply. Following the reasoning that statutes in derogation of the common-law
rule (absolute liability for publishers) should be strictly construed,
an argument could be presented that Congress did not intend to prohibit censorship or grant immunity with regard to the first candidate's
speech. 30
The apparent weight of authority seems to indicate that the
federal government has pre-empted the field of communications and
has entrusted the regulating of the area to the FCC,31 The Communications Act of 1934 32 was enacted "to provide for the regulation
of interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for
other purposes." 33 For this objective the FCC was created to
"execute and enforce the provisions of this Act." 34 The FCC since
1948 has found an immunity implicit within section 315. 35 The dissent regarded the Commission's statements here as dictum and not
binding on the states or the lower federal courts.36 The Commission
has stayed with this position, and declared it anew, though perhaps
qualifiedly in a subsequent case.37 What is more important is to
view the definite efforts made since In re Application WDSU Broadcasting Co.38 to enact an expressed immunity provision within section
30 Cases construing this ambiguity are divided in their holdings. Weiss v.
Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F2d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 876 (1948) (this case involved a first candidate's speech and the
court ruled that the censorship provision of § 15 did not apply). Accord,
Daniel v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc., 10 R.R. 2045, 2046 (N.H. Super.
Ct. 1954). But see Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958)
(the district court intimated that §315 applies whether there is a second
candidate or not).
3"Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers and Mtge. Co., 289 U.S.
266 (1933) (radio and television falls within the scope of federal regulatory
power derived from the commerce clause of the U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
Accord, Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
See 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926) (FCC alone was intended to prescribe the
duties of licensee under §315).
See also Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 113 (1942); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll,
184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F2d
539 (1st Cir. 1940).
3248 Stat. 1064 (1934) (amended by 50 Stat. 189 (1937), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1952)).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

3r,
re Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948) (dictum).
36
Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v .WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 537-38
(1959). See also Huston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199, 204
(S.D. Tec. 1948).
37 In re Application of WDSU Broadcasting Co., 7 R.R. 769 (1952). See
also Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 538
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
3 Supra note 37.
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315. All attempts failed largely due to the inability of the legislators
to agree on what the rule should be, rather than whether there should
be immunity or not. The legislators seem agreed that specific enactments are needed.
A law enacted to accomplish this need should prevent inequitable
liability as well as compensate for injuries after they have occurred.
The present ruling seems to accomplish this. The defamed person
has recourse against the guilty party who uttered the defamatory
remarks, and at the same time the broadcaster, who had no control
over the defamations, is relieved of liability. The familiar objection
to this situation is that the defamed person may have no remedy because the speaker is impecunious. However, the Court overruled this
possible private detriment in favor of greater public benefits. The
broadcaster now needs no liability insurance which indirectly might
cause the rates for political broadcasts to exceed those of ordinary
air time. Higher rates are expressly prohibited by section 315.39 Also,
the broadcaster need not deny all political candidates the use of the
station's facilities which is the broadcaster's privilege under section
41
315.40

Such action is against congressional intent and FCC policy.

Protection for the few who may be deprived compensation is too
expensive if the harm which results is the inhibiting of free political
expression.

FEDERAL PRACTICE-JURISDICTION-IN DIVERSITY CASES FED-

ERAL LAw MUST BE LOOKED TO IN DETERMINING FOREIGN CORPORATION'S AMENABILITY TO SERVICE.-The defendant, an Iowa
corporation, being sued in the Southern District of New York on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, made a motion to dismiss the action
for lack of jurisdiction. Service was attempted on the defendant by
serving a vice-president of the Rocke International Corporation whose
principal place of business was in New York City. For five years
Rocke, who was concededly amenable to service, had solicited sales
for the defendant on a commission basis all over the world except in
the United States, Hawaii, Alaska and Canada. The basis for the
defendant's motion was that its activities within New York were insufficient to bring it within the Court's jurisdiction. The Court in
39 48 Stat. 1088 (1934)
(amended by 66 Stat. 717 (1952), as amended,
47 U.S.C.
§315(b) (1952)).
0
4 Supra note 39, § 315 (a).
41 Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 534-35
(1959). The FCC "considers the carrying of political broadcasts a public
service criterion to be considered both in license renewal proceedings, and in
comparative contests for a radio or television construction permit." Ibid.

